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Shouting Down the Voice of the People:
Political Parties, Powerful PACs, and
Concerns About Corruption
Clarisa Long*
The FederalElection CampaignAct limits the amount offinancialsupport
that political parties may give to candidatesfor federal office. Clarisa Long
argues that these restrictionsviolate politicalparties' FirstAmendment rights
of speech and association. Because the flow of money in the political process
is a proxy for speech, the FirstAmendment requires thatpolitical actors have
access to at least one unrestrictedavenue of communication. While individuals' and PACs' FirstAmendment rights are protected because they may make
unrestricted independent expenditures, parties do not have this opportunity.
Courts have failed to protect party speech, rationalizing that the existence of
corruptionjustifles FirstAmendment restrictionson politicalparties but not on
other entities. Ms. Long argues that parties have unique political messages,
that the corruptionrationale is flawed as applied to parties,and that the harm
arisingfrom limiting party speech outweighs the benefits. She contends that
reducing the existence of corruption can be accomplished more effectively
through means that do not reduce the amount of speech within the political
process, and proposes less restrictive alternatives to the current funding
limitations.
INrRODUCTION

Rarely does a federal agency enter court confidently expecting its claims to
be affirmed on appeal, only to emerge from the fray to find itself declared
unconstitutional. But the Federal Election Commission (FEC) received precisely this surprise when the D.C. Circuit decided Federal Election Commission v. NRA Political Victory Fund.' Holding the FEC's composition 2

unconstitutional on separation of powers grounds,3 the court chose not to rule

* Third-year student, Stanford Law School. My thanks to Professor Ed Buscaglia and the editors
at the Stanford Law Review.
1. 6 F.3d 821 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
2. The FEC's six voting members are appointed by the president, but its two nonvoting members
(the Clerk of the House of Representatives and the Secretary of the Senate) are drawn from the ranks of
the legislature. 2 U.S.C. § 437c(a)(1) (1988).
3. The NRA Political Victory Fund (NRA-PVF) argued that the presence of the nonvoting members allowed Congress to usurp power from the executive branch. "Even if the ex officio members were
to remain completely silent during all deliberations (a rather unlikely scenario), their mere presence as
agents of Congress conveys a tacit message to the other commissioners." 6 F.3d at 826.
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on the claim that the FEC's actions impinged on the NRA Political Victory
Fund's First Amendment rights.
This landmark case, although important for what it does say, is also significant for what it overlooks: the impact of federal campaign financing laws on
First Amendment rights of speech and association. Because money, especially
in the political context, is so closely correlated with speech, a restriction on
who may contribute and how much may be spent is a regulation of political
speech. Courts have not distinguished between political parties and other entities when addressing First Amendment concerns in campaign finance law. 4 Ignoring the unique aspects of political parties, courts have instead analogized
them to political action committees (PACs) and individuals.5 In the election
law context, our judicial system needs to directly address and protect political
6
parties' First Amendment rights of political speech and association.
Courts will soon have the opportunity to consider campaign law reform.
Shortly after taking office, the Clinton administration announced its intention to
revamp campaign finance law, 7 and Congress reacted swiftly with its own version of election law reform. 8 In one form or another, litigation over the issue of
campaign financing will eventually reach the Supreme Court.9 If it would protect free speech within the political process, the Court must carefully consider
the financing restrictions that political parties currently face.
To prevent both corruption and the appearance of corruption, Congress
passed the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA). 10 In the wake of
the Watergate scandal, Congress amended FECA to limit the amount of money
political parties can directly contribute to candidates or spend on their behalf.'1
These contribution and expenditure limits have had unforeseen impacts on both
candidates and parties.' 2 Candidates must devote more time than ever to
4. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 23 (1976) (per curiam) (noting that FECA "defines 'person'
broadly to include" parties).
5. See id.
6. See Stephen E. Gottlieb, Rebuilding the Right of Association: The Right to Hold a Convention
as a Test Case, 11 HoFsmA L. R~v. 191, 200 (1982-1983) ("Limited intrusion on parties, sanctioned by
the Court in early cases, has grown into approval of regulation which sharply conflicts with the first
amendment.").
7. See Richard L. Berke, Clinton Rebuffed on Plan to Reduce Election Spending, N.Y. TuMEs, Feb.
4, 1993, at Al.
8. The Senate passed a bill that limits spending on candidates for federal office. S. 3, 103d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1993). Public dissatisfaction with the current state of election law is widespread. See, e.g.,
Junda Woo, Campaign-DonationSuit, WALL ST. J., Dec. 27, 1993, at 11 (describing how Virginia
voters are suing their legislators).
9. See Rick Wartzman, Congress's Representative to Election Commission Has Six-FigureSalary,
Big Office and Little to Do, WALL. ST. J., Feb. 14, 1994, at A16 (describing upheaval at the FEC as
FederalElection Commission v. NRA Political Victory Fund is appealed to the Supreme Court).
10. Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1972) and current version
at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-456 (1988)).
11. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263
(codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-456 (1988)).
12. See INsTnrum OF PoLmcs, HARVARD UNivERsrry, 96TH CONG., 1ST SESS., AN ANALYSIS OF
TnE IMPACT OF THE FEDERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN ACT 1972-78, at 53-60, 88-92 (Comm. Print 1979)

[hereinafter INsTrruTE OF POLrIcs] (arguing that FECA has made fundraising more difficult for candidates, and has strengthened the parties in some respects while weakening them in others); Stephen E.
Gottlieb, Fleshingout the Right of Association: The Problem of the ContributionLimits of the Federal
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fundraising, soliciting atomistic groups such as PACs for contributions, 13 while
14
political parties have lost much of their control over their candidates' actions.
Although one of the asserted purposes of the reforms was to give the people
more power over the political process, 15 campaign finance laws have not
brought about this change.' 6 Instead, the purported
reforms have shifted the
17
balance of power from political parties to PACs.
The limitations that FECA places on the financial support political parties
can give their candidates violate First Amendment rights of political speech and
association. In Part I of this note, I outline the expenditure and contribution
ceilings FECA imposes on parties in the name of preventing the appearance of
corruption. I then discuss the Supreme Court's treatment of these limits in
Buckley v. Valeo and its progeny, and illustrate how this line of cases has bred
conflicting constitutional standards.
In Part II, I argue that political parties have unique free speech rights by
virtue of their explicit political messages. Campaign finance laws suppress that
message when they constrain the amount of money parties may expend. Limiting a party's financial support of its candidates forecloses avenues of political
speech that have no effective alternatives.
In Part Im, I maintain that FECA's asserted goal of preventing the appearance of corruption does not warrant such severe restrictions on the First
Amendment rights of political parties. First, I demonstrate that limits on party
financing of candidates must satisfy strict scrutiny because they infringe First
Amendment rights. I also suggest how the Court ought to apply First Amendment jurisprudence in the party-candidate context. I then argue that corruption
of the sort the Supreme Court and Congress contemplated (an exchange of dollars for political favors) occurs infrequently if at all in party-candidate interactions. Political reality makes it difficult for candidates to make improper
exchanges with their parties in the manner that the Court and Congress feared.
Election Campaign Act, 49 ALE. L. REv. 825 (1985) (arguing that the provisions have "balkanized" the
American electorate); Gerald M. Pomper, The Decline of the Party in American Elections, 92 POL. SCI.
Q. 21, 29-31 (1977) (explaining the decline of the party as a response to campaign finance reforms). But
see HERBERT E. ALEXANDER, REFoRM AND REALITY: THE FINANCING OF STATE AND LOCAL CAMPAIGNS

92 (1991) (suggesting that decreases in party control of candidates might be beneficial).
13. See HERBERT E. ALEXANDER, FINANCING POLITICS: MONEY, ELECTIONS, AND POLITICAL RE-

Fon 50-51 (4th ed. 1992).

14. See ALEXANDER, supranote 12, at 92 (noting how the widespread use of electronic media now
allows candidates to bypass the party); WiLAM CROTTY, AMERICAN PARTIES INDECLINE 277 (2d ed.
1984); Everett Carli Ladd, Jr., Party "Reform" Since 1968: A Case Study in Intellectual Failure,in THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM UNDER STRONG AND WEAK PARTIES 81, 85-86 (Patricia Bonomi,
James MacGregor Bums & Austin Ranney eds., 1981) [hereinafter CONSTITTONAL SYSTEM].
15. ANTHONY CORRADO, CREA'nvE CAMPAIGNING: PACs AND THE PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION PRO-

cEss 14-15 (1992). The Supreme Court reasoned in Buckley v. Valeo that contribution limits would

promote democratization of the campaign contribution process: "The overall effect of the Act's contribution ceilings is merely to require candidates and political committees to raise funds from a greater

number of persons." Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21-22 (1976).
16. See generally COaRADO, supra note 15 (discussing how campaign reform has caused candi-

dates to alter their campaign strategies so that PACs, not the electorate, play a larger role).
17. See FRANK J. SORAUF, INSIDE CAMPAIGN FINANCE: MYTHS AND REALITIES 15-16 (1992) (illus-

trating the significant rise in the number of PACs from 608 in 1974--the year of FECA's amendments-to 4172 in 1990).
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In Part IV, I propose practical solutions for avoiding unnecessary restrictions on speech in campaign finance. First, I demonstrate that striking down
restrictions on party funding of candidates will not exacerbate the soft money
problem. Then I argue that Congress must tighten the ends-means fit between
avoiding corruption and limiting party contributions. When First Amendment
rights are at stake, the government should be required to prove that its regulations represent the least restrictive alternative. Finally, I suggest less restrictive
means by which Congress could prevent corruption, so that "power and privilege no longer shout down the voice of the people."1 8
I.

MONEY TALKS: CONTROLLING THE FLOW OF PARTY-CANDIDATE SPEECH

The health of democracies, of whatever type and range, depends on a
wretched technical detail-electoral procedure. All the rest is secondary. If
the regime of the elections is successful, if it is in accordance with reality, all
goes well; if not, though the rest progresses beautifully, all goes wrong.
-Jose Ortega y Gasset 19

A.

The FederalElection Campaign Act: A Ceiling on Contributionsand
Expenditures by Political Parties

Reforms of election law are nothing new, and the impetus to enact them has
generally followed on the heels of political scandal.20 Congress passed the
Federal Election Campaign Act of 197121 in response to increasing concerns
about political corruption. 22 Three years later, in the most comprehensive reform of campaign financing law to date, 23 Congress amended the Act in the
wake of the Watergate investigation. 24 To many, the revelation that large
individual contributions made to Richard Nixon's Committee to Re-elect
the President were used in part to finance the illegal Watergate activities
18. President Bill Clinton, Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 1993), in "We Force the Spring": Transcript of Address by President Clinton, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 1993, at All.
19. JOSE ORTEGA Y GASsEr, THE REVOLT OF TIM MASSES 171 (1932).

20. See United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 570-76 (1957) (Frankfurter, J.) (recounting the
history of campaign finance reforms as attempts to restore faith in the campaign process); ALExANDER,
supra note 13, at 23-47 (tracing the history of campaign financing reform efforts); ROBERT R. MUTcH,
CAMPAIGNS, CONGRESS, AND COURTS: THE MAKING OF FEDERAL CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW 24-29
(1988); MAUREEN SHEA,STALLED FROM THE START: A COMMON CAUSE STUDY OF THE FEDERAL. ELEc-

TION COMMISSION 65-73 (1981) (describing a history of federal campaign financing reform from the
Pendleton Act of 1883 to the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971); Kenneth A. Gross, The Enforcement of Campaign FinanceRules: A System in Search of Reform, 9 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 279, 280-83
(1991).
21. Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1972) and current version
at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-456 (1988)).
22. For a list of the dangers of "unregulated electoral financing," see Gene R. Nichol, Money,
Equality and the Regulation of Campaign Finance, 6 CONST. COMMENTARY 319, 319 (1989).

23. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 7 (1976) (per curiam) (quoting lower court opinion, 519 F.2d
821, 831 (D.C. Cir. 1975)).
24. The Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, § 101, 88 Stat.
1263 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-456 (1988)).
25. See Nelson W. Polsby, Moving Toward Equality in Campaign Finance?Another Equivocal
EncounterBetween Theory and Practice,in POWER, INEQUALITY AND DEMocRATIc POLmcs: ESSAYS IN
HONOR OF ROBERT A. DAHL 263, 270 (Ian Shapiro & Grant Reeher eds., 1988) (illustrating how cam-
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symbolized26 an elected officeholder's failure to remain accountable to the

electorate.

The 1974 amendments included, for the first time, limits on contributions
from individuals.27 Because large campaign contributions from discrete
sources created at least an appearance of corruption or undue influence,28 the
1974 amendments capped the amount of money individuals and political parties
could contribute to a candidate2 9 or spend on her behalf 30 In 1976, Congress
amended FECA yet again to comply with Buckley v. Valeo's 3 1 holding that the
Act's expenditure limits were unconstitutional. 32 In the late 1970s, a Harvard
commission determined that the Act weakened the political parties and unduly
burdened campaigns, 33 and Congress amended the Act once more in 1980 in
34
response to the commission's suggestions.
The Federal Election Campaign Act, as currently written, still limits the
amounts of money that political parties can contribute to, and spend on behalf
of, candidates in each national election.35 Different limits apply depending
upon whether the money is categorized as a "contribution" or an "expenditure."
Money given directly to a candidate by an individual or a political party is
considered a contribution, 36 while money spent by an individual or party to
37
support the candidate represents an expenditure on the candidate's behalf.
Independent expenditures are those not subject to the control of the candidate
paign money was used to pay "for the placement of a bug at the Democratic National Committee headquarters"). Three individual donors to Nixon's presidential campaign in 1972 gave $2.1 million, $1
million, and $600,000. BROOKS JACKSON, BROKEN PROMISE: WHY TE FEDEa. ELEcTION COMMISSION FAILED 40 (1990).
26. See James Banner, Discussionof the Ladd Essay, in CoNsTr
ioNA. SysMEm, supra note 14,
at 97, 108.
27. Section 10l(b)(1) of Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (1974) states, "no person shall make
contributions to any candidate with respect to any election for Federal office which, in the aggregate,
exceed $1000"; section 101(b)(3) mandates that "[n]o individual shall make contributions aggregating
more than $25,000 in any calendar year."
28. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25-27. President Nixon's personal lawyer served a prison sentence for
promising to exchange an ambassadorship for a $100,000 campaign contribution. JACKSON, supra note
25, at 40.
29. 18 U.S.C. § 608(b) (Supp. IV 1970) (current version at 2 U.S.C. § 441(a) (1988)).
30. Id. §608(e).
31. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
32. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, § 201, 90 Stat. 475
(codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-456 (1988)).
33. INsTrrurE OF POLMCS, supra note 12, at vii.
34. Pub. L. No. 96-187, 93 Stat. 1339 (1980) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-456
(1988)).
35. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a) (1988) (limiting contributions from parties); id. § 441a(d) (limiting party
expenditures); 11 C.F.R. § 110.7 (1994).
36. 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(A) (1988). Contributions are:
(i) any gift, subscription, loan, advance, or deposit of money or anything of value made by any
person for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal office; or (ii) the payment by
any person of compensation for the personal services of another person which are rendered to
a political committee without charge for any purpose.
Id.
37. Id. § 431(9)(A). Expenditures are: "(i) any purchase, payment, distribution, loan, advance,
deposit, or gift of money or anything of value, made by any person for the purpose of influencing any
election for Federal office; and (ii) a written contract, promise, or agreement to make an expenditure."
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or her campaign, made by an individual or organization to advocate a particular
candidate or issue. 38 Political parties are incapable of maling independent
expenditures.

39

A party typically channels money to a candidate through a maze of committees. 40 Parties use political committees to distribute contributions, 4 1 and candidates must maintain at least one committee authorized to receive and spend
donations. 42 FECA limits a political party's direct contributions to $17,500 per
senatorial candidate 43 and $5000 per congressional candidate." The Act also
requires that any money a party contributes to a candidate in a nonelection year
be included in its election year contribution totals. 4 5
Finally, the Act caps the expenditure levels of national and state party committees in federal elections. On behalf of presidential hopefuls, a party may
spend no more than two cents multiplied by the voting age population of the
United States plus a cost of living adjustment. 46 A party can only spend the
greater of two cents multiplied by the voting age population of the state or
$20,000 on Senate candidates and House candidates from a state entitled to
38. Id. § 431(17). The Act defines independent expenditures as
an expenditure by a person expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified
candidate which is made without cooperation or consultation with any candidate, or any authorized committee or agent of such candidate, and which is not made in concert with, or at
the request or suggestion of, any candidate, or any authorized committee or agent of such
candidate.
Id.
39. The Federal Election Commission has forbidden independent expenditures related to the general election campaign of federal candidates by party committees. 11 C.F.R. § 110.7(b)(4) (1994).
40. These include "political committees" defined as "any committee, club, association, or other
group of persons" that receives more than $1,000 in contributions or spends more than $1000 per year,
or "any local committee of a political party" that receives more than $5000 in contributions or spends or
contributes more than $1000 per year. 2 U.S.C. § 431(4) (1988). A "multicandidate political committee" is one that "has received contributions from more than 50 persons, and... has made contributions
to 5 or more candidates for Federal office." Id. § 441a(5). A "principal campaign committee" is "a
political committee designated and authorized by a candidate." Id. § 431(5). A "connected organization" is "any organization which is not a political committee but which directly or indirectly establishes,
administers or financially supports a political committee." Id. § 431(7).
41. The political committees of a party include each party's national committee, House campaign
committee, and Senate campaign committee. 11 C.F.R. § 110.2(c)(2) (1994).
42. To receive a donation, candidates must establish committees called "principal campaign committees" or "authorized committees" that are entitled to receive contributions and make expenditures on
the candidate's behalf. 2 U.S.C. § 431(5), (6) (1988). The Act requires every candidate for federal
office to establish at least one such committee within fifteen days of announcing her candidacy. Id.
§ 432(e)(1).
43. Id. § 441a(h).
44. Id. § 441a(a)(2).
45. Id. § 441a(a)(3). ("[A]ny contribution made to a candidate in a year other than the calendar
year in which the election is held with respect to which such contribution is made, is considered to be
made during the calendar year in which such election is held."); see also Services Employees Int'l
Union v. Fair Political Practices Comm'n, 721 F. Supp. 1172 (E.D. Ca. 1989), aff'd, 955 F.2d 1312 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3056 (1992) (striking down ballot initiative limiting contributions raised
per fiscal year rather than per election).
46. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(d)(2) (1988). In 1988 this totalled approximately $8.29 million. Carol C.
Darr, Contributions and Expenditures by National,State and Local Party Committees, in ComwoRAT
POLITICAL Aanvrrias 1990: PACs, ETHics, AND LOBBYING LAWS 249, 260 (PLI Corporate Law and
Practice Course Handbook Series No. 695, 1990).
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only one Representative. 4 7 Other House candidates can receive no more than

$10,000 in party expenditures in the general election. 48
"Soft money," or expenditures by state or local committees of a political
party for certain activities, such as party-building efforts (e.g., voter-registration drives and campaign materials used in connection with volunteer activities
on behalf of the party's nominees), do not count against the national party's
expenditure limitations. 4 9 The soft money exception is a loophole that political
parties have used to full advantage. By funneling money to candidates under
state committee auspices, parties
effectively skirt the legal federal limits, thus
50
undermining FECA's purpose.
FECA treats political action committees (PACs) 51 decidedly differently
from parties. A PAC may contribute up to $5000 per candidate to an unlimited
number of federal candidates.5 2 But while each candidate may receive campaign support from only one party, she may receive financial support from
potentially hundreds of PACs. Because a single PAC can contribute as much
money to a House candidate as the candidate's political party, PACs carry special clout with House candidates. FECA's contribution limits on political parties have thus redistributed power within the political process away from
53
parties to PACs.
B.

The Supreme Court's Treatment of PoliticalSpeech

Litigation over FECA has generated numerous opinions from the Supreme
Court.54 In Buckley v. Valeo,55 the first and most far-reaching challenge to the
Act, the Supreme Court addressed FECA's constitutionality. Buckley considered a challenge to the limitation on contributions and expenditures by "persons," a category that implicitly includes political parties. 56 The case also
tackled the constitutionality of ceilings on expenditures that candidates made
from their own personal funds.57 Buckley forced the Court to answer three
questions: Did the challenged provisions of the Act violate First Amendment
rights of speech and association? If so, did the violation constitute a significant
invasion of First Amendment interests, and did a compelling state interest justify it?58 Throughout its 294-page opinion, the Court tried to balance the integ47. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(d)(3)(A) (1988).
48. Id. § 441a(d)(3)(B).
49. Id. § 431(9)(B)(ii), (iv), (viii), (ix).
50. See generally JACKSON, supra note 25, at 39-57. For a discussion of the soft money problem
and how it relates to party contributions to candidates, see text accompanying notes 221-229 infra.
51. A PAC is otherwise known as a "multicandidate political committee." Ross K. BAKER, TmE
NEw FAT CATS: MEMBERS OF CONGRESS As PoLrICAL BENEFACTORS 9 (1989).
52. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(2)(A) (1988).
53. See notes 16-17 supra and accompanying text.
54. See, e.g., Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470
U.S. 480 (1985); California Medical Ass'n v. Federal Election Comm'n, 453 U.S. 182 (1981).

55. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
56. Id. at 23. The Act defines "person" as "an individual, partnership, committee, association,
corporation, labor organization or any other organization or group of persons." 2 U.S.C. § 431(11)

(1988).
57. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 51-54.
58. Id. at 59 n.67.
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rity of the electoral process and the accountability of elected officials with the
need to protect the rights of speech and association.
1. The constitutionality of contribution and expenditure limits: Buckley
v. Valeo.
The Supreme Court has declared that contributing to or expending money
on behalf of a candidate is tantamount to political speech.5 9 Nevertheless, the
Court has also found that the interest in limiting actual and apparent corruption, 60 the possibility of which is "inherent in the process of raising large monetary contributions," 6 1 outweighs the First Amendment concerns posed by
FECA's contribution ceilings. 62 Admitting that limits on contributions from
"persons" may tread upon the freedom of political association, the Buckley
Court nonetheless justified burdening that right by finding that the government
63
possessed a substantial interest in squelching any suggestion of corruption.
The Court also upheld FECA's contribution limits against freedom of speech
challenges as "entail[ing] only a marginal restriction on the contributor's ability to engage in free communication." 4 Buckley declared that contributor
speech, whether made by an individual or a political party, is simply an expression of support for the candidate made with the first dollar contributed. 65 Increasing the size of a contribution, according to the Court, did not perceptibly
increase the amount of communication. 66 A contribution was only indirect
speech (and therefore entitled to less than full First Amendment protection)
because the contributor did not control the communication her money goes to
support. 67

In contrast to contribution limits, the Buckley Court held expenditure limits
on nonparty entities unconstitutional because they "substantially" restrained
69
political expression 68 and were not supported by compelling state interests.
Because a candidate cannot bribe herself, limiting a candidate's use of personal
or family funds did not satisfy the government's goal of preventing corruption. 70 The Court's rationale for allowing independent expenditures was a little
more complicated. First, the fact that candidates could not control independent
59. Id. at 22 ("Making a contribution, like joining a political party, serves to affiliate a person with
a candidate.... The Act's contribution ceilings thus limit one important means of associating with a
candidate or committee.").
60. Id. at 26-27.
61. Id. at 30.
62. Id. at 29.
63. Id.; see also First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 788-89 & n.26 (1978) (finding a state
interest in preventing electoral corruption or the appearance of corruption).
64. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 20-21.
65. Id. at 21.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 19. "[Ihe Act's limitations on expenditures by campaign organizations and political
parties provide substantially greater room for discussion and debate... [than limitations on contributions]." Id. at 20.
69. Id. at 55-58.
70. Id. at 53. Buckley defined corruption as an improper quid pro quo. Id. at 26-27. But see
Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652,660(1990) (Marshall, J.) (stating that corrup-
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expenditures reduced the possibility of undue influence. 7 1 Second, the Court
deemed restrictions on independent spending overbroad and incapable of eliminating quid pro quo deals, because persons or groups could always run ads
terms advosupporting the candidate's view, as long as they did not "in express
72
cate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate."
Buckley implies that spending (as opposed to merely contributing) money
constitutes direct political speech. Limiting expenditures therefore reduces the
"quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth
of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached."'73 With expenditures, unlike contributions, the more you spend, the more you say.74 As one
Justice quipped, "[b]eing free to engage in unlimited political expression suban automobile as far
ject to a ceiling on expenditures is like being free to drive '75
and as often as one desires on a single tank of gasoline.
The Court created a fine distinction. 7 6 On the one hand, it decided that the
First Amendment prohibits the government from limiting "spending to promote
one's political views."'77 But on the other hand, the Court stated that capping
the amount one could contribute restricted free communication only marginally. 78 The narrow line drawn between expenditure limitations and contribution ceilings led one commentator to note that
Buckley allows Congress to prohibit a $50,000 offering to a candidate to help
defer the costs of a television campaign, but not direct payment by a donor to
the station to keep the ads running. The drafters of the FECA were correct in
interpretation of the Constitution renders the Act
thinking that this "wooden"
79
"virtually meaningless."

Political parties fall between Buckley's cracks. Direct speech by candidates
is protected because they may freely spend their own money to advocate their
election. Similarly, PACs may engage in direct speech through unlimited independent expenditures. Political parties, however, have no such outlets for
tion includes "the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of [corporate] wealth," not
just quid pro quo corruption).
71. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 46-47.
72. Id. at 45.

73. Id. at 19 (footnote omitted).
[V]irtually every means of communicating ideas in today's mass society requires the expenditure of money. The distribution of the humblest handbill or leaflet entails printing, paper, and
circulation costs. Speeches and rallies generally necessitate hiring a hall and publicizing the
event. The electorate's increasing dependence on television, radio, and other mass media for
news and information has made these expensive modes of communication indispensable instruments of effective political speech.

Id.
74. "It is clear that a primary effect of these expenditure limitations is to restrict the quantity of
campaign speech by individuals, groups, and candidates. The restrictions, while neutral as to the ideas
expressed, limit political expression 'at the core of our electoral process and of the First Amendment
freedoms."' Id. at 39 (quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968)).
75. Id. at 19 n.18.
76. For the view that the Court's distinction is "unpersuasive and anomalous," see Nichol, supra
note 22, at 320.
77. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 57.
78. Id. at 20-21.
79. Nichol, supra note 22, at 321.
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direct speech; unlike candidates, parties may not spend their own money freely
to advocate their candidates' election, nor can they make independent expenditures. Limited only to the indirect speech of contributions, party communication does not receive the same level of protection as that of other groups within
the political process.
Buckley determined the constitutionality of FECA before the 1974 amend-

ments were tested in practice.8 0 The case is a compromise attempting to mitigate the worst excesses of campaign finance law while protecting individual
First Amendment guarantees, 8 ' rather than a concerted attempt to protect the
First Amendment interests of the political parties.8 2 By negotiating this balance, claim some authors, the Court relied upon a constitutional view of the
First Amendment as specifically "designed to guarantee the free flow of information necessary to an informed electorate.183 But the only thing that seems to
84
flow freely after Buckley is PAC money to candidates.
2. Buckley's progeny: CMA, NCPAC, and CARC.
The distinction between contributions and expenditures has continued to
give the Court considerable trouble. In CaliforniaMedical Association v. Federal Election Commission,8 5 for example, appellant California Medical Association (CMA) challenged the constitutionality of the $5000 limit on
86
contributions to multicandidate political committees (PACs).
In response to CMA's First Amendment argument, the plurality reasoned
that CMA's contribution to a PAC was not direct speech because the PAC
expressed views CMA did not control. Because the contribution was merely
indirect or "proxy" speech, it merited less than full First Amendment protection.8 7 CMA and its members could still engage in direct speech, as FECA's
limitations "did not directly infringe on the ability of contributors to express
80. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTInIoNAL LAW 1133 (2d ed. 1988). "One consequence of this expedited review [of Buckley v. Valeo] was that the Supreme Court, working in a factual
vacuum, was forced to indulge in more than a little empirical speculation about such issues as the
circumvention of expenditure limits and the impact of those limits on campaign speech." Id. at 1131
n.1.
81. See Joel L. Fleishman & Pope McCorkle, Level-Up Rather than Level-Down: Towards a New
Theory of Campaign Finance Reform, 1 J.L. & POL'Y 211, 222-24 (1984).
82. Buckley did not apply First Amendment jurisprudence to political parties. Instead, the Court's
analysis focuses on the contributing power of discrete persons or relatively small groups of people.
83. See Irving R. Kaufman, Electoral Integrity vs. Free Speech, N.Y. TmiEs, Mar. 7,1988, at A19;
see also First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978) (explaining that freedom of political
speech is "indispensable to decisionmaking in a democracy"); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102
(1940) ("Freedom of discussion ... must embrace all issues about which information is needed or
appropriate to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of their period.").
84. "[I]n 1986 ...it was estimated that nearly half the Representatives got 50% or more of their
money from PACs." K.D. Ewing, The Legal Regulation of Campaign Financing in American Federal
Elections, 47 CAMBRDGE L.J. 370, 396 (1988); see also AL xANDFR, supra note 13, at 19 ("[AIl 50
states report ever increasing PAC involvement in the financing of campaigns, both in terms of the PACs
and the amounts being contributed.") (citations omitted).
85. 453 U.S. 182 (1981).
86. Id. at 198.
87. Id.
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their own political views."'88 While California Medical Association's First
Amendment outcome is consistent for individuals and groups that have alternative channels of direct speech open to them, this case, like Buckley, fails to
protect fully the speech interests of political parties, which have no avenues of
direct communication open to them under FECA.
CMA also made a corruption argument, claiming that concerns about the
existence of an improper quid pro quo did not apply to contributions made to a
committee rather than a candidate. 89 The Court rejected this argument, fearing
that individuals would simply use contributions to multicandidate committees
to circumvent the limits on their direct contributions to individual candidates. 90
Contributions, even when made to a group rather than a single person, still
raised the possibility of a quid pro quo and posed a threat of actual or potential
corruption that expenditures did not.9 1 The contribution/expenditure distinction did not cease to haunt the Court here, nor did later cases clarify the matter.
Four years later, in FederalElection Commission v. National Conservative
Political Action Committee (NCPAC), the Supreme Court again refused to
equate limits on contributions with limits on expenditures. 92 The Court reaffirmed the unconstitutionality of expenditure limitations, but its rationale still
failed to differentiate contribution limitations from expenditure restrictions on
either First Amendment or corruption grounds. 93 Stating that "[e]lected officials are influenced to act contrary to their obligations of office by the prospect
of. ..infusions of money into their campaigns," 94 in the very next breath the
Court opined that "[t]he fact that candidates and elected officials may alter or
reaffirm their own positions on issues in response to political messages paid for
95
by the PACs can hardly be called corruption."
When the political process does not involve a candidate at all, the Court has
flatly rejected the corruption justification for contribution limits. In Citizens

Against Rent Control v. Berkeley (CARC), 96 for example, the appellants chal-

lenged the constitutionality of a municipal ordinance that placed a $250 limit
on all contributions to a committee formed to debate a ballot measure. 97 Because such a committee did not advocate on behalf of a candidate, the concurrence concluded that the ordinance failed both to advance a sufficiently
88. Id. at 195.
89. See id. at 198.
90. Id.
91. See id. at 203. "Multicandidate political committees are ... essentially conduits for contributions to candidates, and as such they pose a perceived threat of actual or potential corruption." Id.
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
92. 470 U.S. 480, 497 (1985).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. 454 U.S. 290, 298 (1981). "Buckley identified a single narrow exception to the rule that limits
on political activity were contrary to the First Amendment. The exception relates to the perception of
undue influence of large contributors to a candidate." Id. at 296-97.
97. ladat 291. The relevant section of the municipal code read: "No person shall make, and no
campaign treasurer shall solicit or accept, any contribution which will cause the total amount contributed
by such person with respect to a single election in support of or in opposition to a measure to exceed two
hundred and fifty dollars.' Id. at 292.
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important government interest and to avoid unnecessary abridgment of freedom
of speech: 9 8 "The risk of corruption perceived in cases involving candidate
elections simply is not present in a popular vote on a public issue." 99 Because
the ordinance provisions requiring disclosure of contributors sufficiently satisfied the state's concerns with corruption, the Court struck down the ordinance
as overbroad. 100
Critics may argue that the dismissal of the corruption argument in Citizens
Against Rent Control should not be extended to party speech about candidates.
In contrast to candidates, who may be bribed, referenda possess no such foibles. But the corruption rationale behind the contribution/expenditure distinction ceases to exist altogether when the contributor and candidate share the
same overlapping set of interests, thus obviating the need to alter a candidate's
position on an issue by infusing cash into her campaign. Nor is the quid pro
quo rationale compelling when only one agent is present in the transaction,
such as when the candidate contributes to her own campaign.
Buckley's progeny create a delicate distinction between the regulatable
proxy speech of contributions to an identifiable candidate and the protected
direct speech that expenditures entail. This distinction is critically relevant to
political parties. Whether FECA's limits apply to party speech depends upon
whether the voting public would associate the party's political message with an
identifiable candidate. To illustrate, suppose a political party paid for a television commercial in which one of its candidates discussed an issue but did not
advocate her own election. Because the audience can visually identify the candidate, they will probably consider the ad party speech about the candidate
rather than party speech about an issue. Hence, a court would count the cost of
the advertisement against the party's limits. If the party broadcast the same
advertisement over the radio, however, and the candidate did not identify herself or advocate her own election, the First Amendment calculus would turn on
how "clearly identified" the candidate was. If a court determined that an audience could not reasonably identify the candidate, the party's message would
constitute issue speech and receive full First Amendment protection. But if the
party could reasonably expect an audience to identify the candidate (by distinctive voice or accent, for example), the ad would qualify as speech in support of
a candidate.
IE.

LET THE PEOPLE SPEAK: POLITICAL PARTIES AS VEHICLES FOR
POLITICAL SPEECH

By tightly capping the amounts political parties may spend in support of
their candidates, FECA atomized the process of raising campaign money. As a
98. Id. at 302 (Blackmun & O'Connor, JJ., concurring) (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,25

(1976)).
99. Id. at 298 (quoting First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 790 (1978)). "To place a
Spartan limit-or indeed any limit-on individuals wishing to band together to advance their views on a

ballot measure, while placing none on individuals acting alone, is clearly a restraint on the right of
association." Id. at 296 (emphasis added).
100. Id. at 298-99.
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result, PACs have proliferated like fruit flies on an overripe banana. Ironically,
this shift in control undermined FECA's original purpose of giving power back
to the people. Political parties are the only institutions large enough to provide
a countervailing force to PACs, and they offer a unique avenue for political
speech which FECA's contribution limits foreclose. The Supreme Court
should reestablish the eroded First Amendment rights of political parties. Unless the courts or Congress abolish or at least raise the limits on party support
of candidates, PACs will continue to shout down the voice of the people.
A.

Party Support of Candidates Constitutes Political Speech

Campaign contributions have long been accepted as an expression of one's
political preferences. Because it is nearly impossible to speak effectively in the
political process without spending money, the Supreme Court readily concedes
that "money is [political] speech." 10 1 Political speech, including that of political parties, serves the crucial function of informing the public. The Court has
frequently emphasized the important role the First Amendment plays "in affording the public access to discussion, debate, and the dissemination of infor10 2
mation and ideas."
Tight constraints on contributions do not necessarily diminish the number
or quality of issues discussed in a campaign. But when contribution limits
prevent the candidate from raising as much money as she could have absent the
limits, political speech diminishes and the electorate suffers.10 3 The Buckley
Court recognized this danger 1 4 and noted the importance of preventing any
reduction in the "number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and
05
the size of the audience reached."'
Despite its concern that campaign financing regulations reduce the quantity
and quality of political speech, the Court has consistently tilted the balance
between First Amendment protection and concerns about corruption in favor of
asserted state interests. 106 The Court's conclusions rest on the assumption that
funding limits do not fatally abridge the contributor's freedom of speech because she may convey the same information through other avenues of
communication.
This assumption does not apply to political parties, however. Limiting the
amount a party may contribute or spend in a candidate's election narrows a
vital avenue of party communication. Suppose, for example, that the Dubuque,
Iowa branch of the Teamster's Union holds a convention. The Teamsters invite
101. See, e.g., Buckley, 424 U.S. at 16-17.
102. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978).
103. Buckley briefly addressed the danger that "contribution restrictions could have a severe impact on political dialogue if the limitations prevented candidates and political committees from amassing
the resources necessary for effective advocacy." 424 U.S. at 21. But it dismissed the danger because
"[tlhere is no indication . . . that the contribution limitations imposed by the Act would have any
dramatic adverse effect on the funding of campaigns and political associations." Id.
104. "Discussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates are integral to the
operation of the system of government established by our Constitution." Id. at 14.
105. Id. at 19.
106. Id. at 25, 66.
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the Democratic party to set up a booth in the convention hall, and the party
wants to distribute flyers containing the following announcement: "The Democratic party supports the re-election of candidate Susan Smith for Representative from Iowa's Second District. She is pro-labor and has consistently voted
in favor of allocating more of our national budget to improving interstate highways." Undoubtedly these flyers contain informative political speech by the
party to the electorate. Yet they are not accorded full First Amendment protection. FECA allows the flyers only if the party includes the cost of producing
them against its $5000 contribution limit or $10,000 expenditure limit for representatives. If the Democratic party had already reached its spending limit
running ads about Smith's record on agricultural issues, FECA would prohibit
it from discussing her record on any other issue. Therefore, it cannot be true
that limitations on a party's ability "to give money directly to candidates
is 'only a marginal restriction upon the ability to engage in free
communication."' 1 0o 7

One might argue that the restrictions do not diminish speech because the
public can anticipate what a party would say about its own candidate. This
presupposes that parties always glowingly support their candidates. But this
assumption has two flaws. First, it is inaccurate. A political party does not
display identical support for all its candidates, nor does it deliver the same
message about each. Second, the predictability of a message does not justify
limiting it.1° 8 By closing avenues of political speech by parties, campaign fi-

nance legislation impinges on their First Amendment rights without serving the
governmental interests that purportedly justify the restriction.
B.

ContributionLimitations Make CandidatesResponsive to Special
Interests at the Expense of the Electorate

The Buckley Court, in upholding FECA, noted that one of Congress' major
purposes in passing the Act was to limit the influence of single contributors. 10 9
It is ironic that FECA, which sought to prevent the "view of government as
responsive only or mainly to special interests," 110 has had precisely the opposite effect. FECA's contribution limitations on parties have given PACs unprecedented power and influence. 1 Some voters have come to believe that
candidates represent special interests better than the electorate as a whole. In
December 1993, for example, voters in Virginia filed suit in federal court chal12
lenging the constitutionality of out-of-state PAC contributions to candidates.'
These voters claim that PAC support of candidates has reached such propor107. Id. at 20-21.
108. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765,790 (1978) (finding that the effectiveness
of political speech has no bearing on whether it should be suppressed).
109. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25.
110. Harold Leventhal, Courts and Political Thickets, 77 COLU'M. L. REv. 345, 362 (1977).
111. INsTrrtrE oF POLmCS, supra note 12, at 2.

112. Woo, supra note 8, at 11.
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tions that legislators now represent the3 distinct interests of various PACs rather
than the people of their home state."
Limits on party contributions are also limits on the political speech of voters. Adequate representation depends on voter communication.'1 4 Especially
in politics, money talks both loudly and well. A candidate for the House of
Representatives may accept only $5000 from her political party, but may collect $5000 per PAC from an unlimited number of PACs. Restricting the power
of parties to speak through contributions to their candidates dilutes the voices
of the party and the electorate and shuts down a vital channel of political
speech.
1. Partiesprovide a uniqueforum for political speech on behalf of the
electorate.
11 5
Political parties play a pivotal role in a republican form of government.
Because they are bodies large enough to translate the people's will into action, 116 they bridge the gap between the electors and the government, ensuring

that the people have a voice.1 17 They also perform a crucial role in the electoral process,1 18 as the courts have recognized on more than one occasion.1 1 9
The Founding Fathers distrusted parties, calling them "factions,"' 120 and the
Constitution makes no mention of them. Although the United States pioneered
the modem party system, Americans often view parties skeptically.' 2 1 In fact,
we tend to distrust politicians as a class, a trait some authors have credited to
113. Id. As one plaintiff in the suit complained, "[w]e no longer have senators who represent
distinct states. We have senators who represent distinct groups.... They are free agents to go out and
market their representation to anybody they want to." Id.
114. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. 127, 137 (1961)
("mhe whole concept of representation depends upon the ability of the people to make their wishes
known to their representatives").
115. See, e.g., Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1943), reh'g denied, 322 U.S. 769 (1944).
116. E.E. SCNATrSCHNEmER, PARTY GovFERirmENT 13-15 (1942).
117. For a view that parties promote popular participation in government, see JAMES L. SUNDQtST, CONsTITUTIONAL REFoRM AND EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT 90-92 (rev. ed. 1992) (summarizing the
literature on the theory of party government); C.B. MacPherson, Social Conflict, PoliticalParties and
Democracy, in PoLmcAL PAtrIES AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR 53, 56 (William J. Crotty, Donald M.
Freeman & Douglas S. Gatlin eds., 1966) (noting that parties "act as a safeguard against a permanent
irresponsible oligarchy").
118. See JEANE JORDAN KIRKPATRICK, DisMANTLING THE PARTES: RELECTIONS ON PARTY REFORM AND PARTY DECOMPOSITION 5 (1978) (describing the importance of parties in organizing democratic competition for public office and in holding leaders accountable); NELSON W. POLSBY,
CONSEQUENCES OF PARTY REFORM 182 (1983) (describing parties as essential to the nomination process
because of their role in mobilizing voters, recruiting candidates, and sponsoring campaigns).
119. See, e.g., Rosario v. Rockefeller, 458 F.2d 649, 652 (2d Cir. 1972) ("The entire political
process depends largely upon the satisfactory operation of these institutions.").
120. THE FEDERALST No. 10, at 63 (James Madison) (Edward J. Bourne ed., 1937). Not all early
statesmen disapproved of parties. Martin Van Buren believed that a bipartisan system provided an outlet
for interest groups. See JAMtES W. CEASER, PRESIDENTmAL SELECION: THEORY AND DEVELOPMENT 135

(1979).
121. See Ladd, supra note 14, at 85; see also AUsTIN RANNEY, CURING THE MISCHIEFS OF FAC-

TON: PARTY REFORM IN AMERCA 22-57 (1975) (exploring the persistence in the United States of antiparty thought); Gottlieb, supra note 6, at 223-43 (chronicling how parties have come to be associated
in the popular mind with corruption and political machines, which has led courts to accept limitations on
the right of association). But see Lee Benson, Discussion of the Ladd Essay, in CONST=rITIONAL SYS-
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"the culture's distinctive individualism." 122 Yet for all our distrust, we also
parties play a very valuable role in maintaining a democratic
acknowledge that1 23
political process.
The American political system has developed through competition between
political parties and the regular tradeoffs of power that this entails. 1 24 Electoral
competition enhances democracy and provides the electorate with distinct political alternatives that motivate people to express a preference.1 25 To the extent
that parties incorporate their differences into their agendas and change their
they facilitate the competition
platforms to respond to people's preferences,
1 26
that is central to democratic elections.
Parties present unique opportunities for speech and association that other
organizations cannot provide. Unlike PACs, parties have varied and long-term
interests that extend beyond the next election. Parties also represent a broader
donor base than PACs. They can help assure that groups without financial
access to candidates (either because they lack the funds to personally contribute
or because they do not have a PAC representing their interests) are not shut out
of the system. Whereas interest groups by definition do not attempt to win a
majority, 127 parties provide a means by which the vast majority of people can
gain both political identity and political leverage.12 8
Political institutions are more responsive to majorities when interest groups
work together strategically to form coalitions. 129 Strong parties help develop
TEM, supra note 14, at 97, 106 (noting that at some points in American history, party affiliation was "a
fundamental part of one's personal and group identity").
122. Ladd, supra note 14, at 85.
123. Few political theorists deny the importance of political parties to democracy. See, e.g., KIRPATRICK, supra note 118, at 5 (describing the importance of parties in performing critical electoral
roles). Political parties are generally recognized as having two roles: containing and damping factionalism by cutting across social groups, and representing the views of citizens and groups by mobilizing
people into the political process. MacPherson, supra note 117, at 56 ("[Tlhese functions ... must be
performed if democracy is to be maintained.").
124. "Competition in ideas and governmental policies is at the core of our electoral process and of
the First Amendment freedoms." Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968).
125. "Without competition, no other values can be achieved." Gottlieb, supra note 6, at 213
(describing the view that parties give voice to the otherwise unrepresented by aggregating their needs,
views, and perspectives). Parties translate popular will into action, act as intermediaries between the
citizen and the government, provide a forum to build coalitions and balance political interests, act as a
check on presidential power, and integrate a "centrifugally inclined government." CEAsaR, supra note
120, at 16-17; Ladd, supra note 14, at 89-92.
126. CEASER, supra note 120, at 133 ("[M]ass democracy depends on party competition which
alone can provide the means by which citizens determine the direction of public policy."); MoNEy,
ELECTIONS AND DEMocRAcY: REFORMING CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGN FINANCE 12 (Margaret Latus Nugent & John R. Johannes eds., 1990) ("[G]enuine competition seems to be the best guarantee that
citizens are actually able to control their government."). Public opinion polls also indicate that the
average voter believes strong party competition strengthens democracy. RANmNEY, supra note 121, at 5455.
127. See SCHA'rrscmNEDER, supra note 116, at 187-89.
128. See Michael A. Fitts, The Vices of Virtue: A Political Party Perspective on Civic Virtue
Reforms of the Legislative Process, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 1567 (1988) (describing how parties improve
representation of public views by incorporating sections of the public agenda into their platforms).
129. See POLSBY,supra note 118, at 66 (arguing that parties provide a forum within which factions can work together). Political parties can help stabilize the electoral process, and the Court has
found a stable political process to be a compelling state interest. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 736
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the coalitions and voting blocs essential to democratic government. 130 They
facilitate cohesion by offering alternatives to interest groups at odds with each
other and by informing voters of candidates' positions. 13 1 Parties also hold
elected officials responsible for their performance. 132 A politician not facing
reelection has much less incentive to be politically responsible than the party
she belongs to, which must justify the actions of its members in the next election and beyond.13 3 Parties are unique institutions in our culture, representing
myriad interests in a way that PACs cannot, and the political speech they provide cannot be found elsewhere in our electoral system.
Strong parties are not a positive force in isolation. The benefits they provide derive not just from the parties acting independently, but also from the role
they play as interactive units, coalition formers, and faction preventers in the
context of a larger system. 134 A strong party system requires more than one
party, each with enough strength so that the nonmajority party poses enough of
a credible threat to the majority party to keep it accountable and responsive to
the electorate.'
2.

35

PACs provide disproportionaterepresentationfor small but powerful

special interests.
Limiting freedom of speech and association might be one way to keep interest groups from forming, but, as Madison wrote, this remedy would be "worse
than the disease. ' 136 The more diverse a society, the more interests clamor to
(1974) ("[S]plintered parties and unrestrained factionalism may do significant damage to the fabric of
government.").
130. See LARRY J. SABATO, THE PARTY's JusT BEGUN: SHAPING POLITICAL PARTIES FOR
AMERICA's FuTuRE 22-23 (1988) (arguing that weak parties fail "to generate sufficient political power
to turn the constitutional mill"). But for the view that strong parties do not necessarily govern better, see
Benson, supra note 121, at 107-08 (comments of David Thelen and Donald Robinson).
131. See Gottlieb, supra note 6, at 217-19 (describing the public's reliance interests in parties).
132. See SABATO, supra note 130, at 23 (arguing that accountability is impossible without political
parties).

133. Alexis de Tocqueville said of presidential races in America:
[As the election approaches, t]he President... is absorbed by the cares of self-defense. He
no longer governs for the interest of the State, but for that of his re-election; he does homage
to the majority, and instead of checking its passions, as his duty commands him to do, he
frequently courts its worst caprices.
1 ALEXIs DE TocQuEvn.E, DzoCRACY INAMERICA 134 (Henry Reeve trans., rev. ed. 1899).
134. For a discussion of the concepts of "party" and "party system," see SABATO, supra note 130,
at 5-30 (urging greater party autonomy and freedom from inappropriate state regulation); Austin Ranney, The Concept of "Party," in POLITICAL RESEARCH AND PoLrrcA THEORY 143-62 (Oliver Garceau
ed., 1968); Stephen E. Gottlieb, The Dilemma of Campaign FinanceReform, 18 HoFSTRA L. Rev. 213,
279-92 (1989) (arguing that both strong and weak party models are appropriate solutions to different
political problems).
135. See generally AusTiN RANN E, THE Docr'iun OF RESPONSIBLE PARTY GovERNMENT 12
(1962) (popular control of government can best be achieved by parties of approximately equal strength
who can provide the populace with viable political alternatives); SCHATrSCHNEiDER, supra note 116, at
199-200, 207 (arguing that although political parties are weak in the U.S., strong parties present the best
way to further democracy); Gottlieb, supra note 6, at 208-21 (arguing that strong parties with broad
interests enhance political stability more than weak, factionalized parties).
136. THE FEDERAIiST No. 10, supra note 120, at 63.
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be heard, and the greater the danger of significant division.' 37 The rise of
PACs stems from the campaign finance reforms that legitimated them.1 38
These reforms traded one set of "fat cats" for another, replacing large individual contributors with PACs. 139 Since FECA's enactment, PACs have become
powerful campaign contributors, 140 both in sheer numbers 14 1 and in terms of
the total funding they give candidates. 42
PACs present several normative problems. First, by definition PACs represent a narrow group of interests rather than the public as a whole. Their real
danger arises, however, from the disproportionate power they wield by virtue
of the sums of money they command and the single issue that unites their members. 143 As a result, candidates and office holders have difficulty withstanding
the onslaught of PAC influence. 44 In the face of such influence, elected officials may bargain among interests, tailoring their speech and actions to please
particular PACs rather than representing the broader interests of their
electors. 145
137. See Fitts, supra note 128, at 1603-09, 1614-15; Richard Jankowski, PreferenceAggregation
in Political Parties and Interest Groups: A Synthesis of Corporatistand Encompassing Organization
Theory, 32 AM. J. POL. ScI. 105 (1988); see also POLSBY, supranote 118, at 146-52 (hypothesizing the
consequences of the elimination of political parties).
138. FECA allows corporations and unions to use funds from their treasuries for the "establishment, administration, and solicitation of contributions to a separate segregated fund to be utilized for
political purposes." 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2)(C) (1988). One of the reasons for the rise of PACs is that
individuals with like-minded interests possess more efficient means of commuricating, such as electronic mail, computerized databases, and computer networks. M. ETHAN KATSH, TrE ELECTRONIC MEDIA AND THE TRANsFoRMATION OF LAW 242 (1989).
139. See CORRADO, supra note 15, at 107-39 (asserting that PACs provide fundraising advantages
that parties do not); CROTTY, supra note 14, at 133-34 (observing that PACs are taking over the financial
roles once played by parties); DAVID B. MAGLEBY & CANDICE J. NELSON, THm MONEY CHasE: CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFoRM 72-97 (1990) (noting that candidates are turning from individual contributors to PACs for campaign money).
140. Ewing, supra note 84, at 370. But see CROITrY, supra note 14, at 134 ("The chief source of
funds remains individual contributions, although these have been in a steady decline since 1974, falling
from about three-fourths of the total to something over one-half by 1980.").
141. See Ewing, supra note 84, at 395 (noting that the number of PACs rose from 608 in 1974, to
1146 in 1976, 2551 in 1980, and 4567 in 1987). There were 4172 PACs in 1990; no one knows for
certain why their numbers levelled off. ALEXANNDER, supra note 13, at 59-60.
142. PAC support of congressional campaigns swelled from 17% in 1978 to 32% in 1990.
SoRAusF, supra note 17, at 31. But since 1986, PAC support and numbers have declined marginally
along with the general fall in candidate spending. Id. at 12-16.
143. Id. William Crotty notes that:
It is much easier for a candidate to court one of a series of wealthy PACs to acquire the money
he or she needs to run an effective race. As the costs of campaigns continue to escalate, there
is an attractiveness and economy to fundraising through direct appeals to sympathetic PACs.
The PACs, in effect, help minimize one of the most time-consuming and unpleasant aspects of
campaigning, raising the money necessary to run for elective office.
CROTTY, supra note 14, at 133.
144. Fitts, supra note 128, at 1629.
145. Though PACs may ease the burdens on candidates in financing their campaigns, incumbent
candidates who depend on PACs may become insulated from the constituents they are supposed to
represent. FRANK J. SoRAu, MONEY IN AMERICAN ELECTIONS 347-49 (1988). William Crotty explains

some recent attempts by PACs to flex their political muscle:
The decline of party influence in campaigns has paralleled the surge in importance of the
PACs. As the parties have become less cohesive, PACs have become aggressive in funding
campaigns, requiring prospective candidates to pledge to support issues critical to the PAC's
constituency (from abortion to curbs on foreign trade), and even supplying media consultants
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A study of legislation in New Mexico provides a perfect example of this
phenomenon. New Mexico suffers from the highest drunk driving rate in the
nation-more than two-and-a-half times the national average.14 6 The problem
stems in large part from the prevalence of drive-up windows in liquor stores
and bars. 147 The state legislature refuses to prohibit the windows, despite a
decade of lobbying by voters and citizens groups. 148 The New Mexican legislators are not deaf to the electorate; they are merely marching to the beat of a
more moneyed drummer. With the liquor lobby financing up to 25 percent of
local legislators' campaigns, "legislation supported by the liquor lobby is
roughly four times more likely than other bills to be passed, while bills that
149
[the lobby] opposes are rejected at 10 times the rate of other legislation."
The legislature has consistently voted down bills that would have allowed municipalities to raise excise taxes on liquor in order to fund alcohol-treatment
programs. 150
Why would voters continue to elect legislators who consistently ignore their
needs? The answer lies buried in a mountain of cash. The probability151of winSupning an election correlates with a candidate's ability to raise money.
pose a federal candidate in New Mexico chose to run a campaign against drunk
driving. Such a stance would result in the candidate not only losing funding
from the mighty liquor lobby, but also incurring its powerful ire. FECA allows
the lobby to make virtually unlimited independent expenditures on negative
advertising against the renegade candidate.' 5 2 The candidate, in contrast, may
respond using only her own personal funds, party funds, and contributions from
153
voters and other special interests like Mothers Against Drunk Driving.
FECA limits any response by the candidate's political party. If political parties
were better able to fund their candidates, these candidates could afford to stand
up to powerful special interests. By offsetting the dire political costs of opposand campaign managers for candidates they favor. In some cases, they have gone so far as to
recruit their own candidates and then run their campaigns in primaries against the established
party candidate, with whom they differed, or in general elections.
CRoTry, supra note 14, at 133.
146. Robert Tomsho, One for the Road: How Hardit Is to Get Drinkersoff Highways Is Clearin
New Mexico, WALL ST. J., Dec. 31, 1993, at Al.

147. Id.
148. Id.

149. Id.
150. Id.
151. See GARY C. JACOBSON, MONEY IN CONGRESSIONAL E crroNs 218 (1980) (finding that
absolute, not relative, amounts of money spent determine the outcome of an election). With the amount
of funding largely determining the effectiveness of a campaign, candidates are understandably obsessed
by campaign fundraising. Money is so connected to campaign activity that it has been called "the
mother's milk of politics." ALs.moAN, supra note 13, at 1 (quoting Jesse Unruh). As Will Rogers
noted, "[p]olitics has got so expensive that it takes a great deal of money even to get beat with.'
Kaufman, supra note 83, at A19 (quoting Rogers).
152. Because negative campaigning "advocat[es] the election or defeat of a clearly identified
candidate ... without cooperation or consultation with any candidate," 2 U.S.C. § 431(17) (1988), it
would qualify as an independent expenditure and would not be subject to limits after Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1 (1976).
153. MADD, however, with few financing resources, has repeatedly failed to stop New Mexico's
liquor lobby. Tomsho, supra note 146, at 32.
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ing a PAC, party funding could free candidates to be more responsive to the
interests of the voters.
PACs not only wield disproportionate influence, but their constituencies
change the very tenor of politics. As one journalist notes, "the preponderance
of PACs representing upper-middle-class donors conspires to tilt the scales of
influence heavily against the working middle class and the poor."1 54 In recent
years, PACs have generated as much as 47 and 29 percent of total contributions
to Senate and House incumbent races, respectively.15 5 Because campaign finance reform did not limit the total contributions from PACs as it did for indi1 56
viduals and parties, PACs may donate to an unlimited number of candidates.
While PACs are not subject to limitations on independent expenditures, they do
face caps on the amounts they may contribute to candidates.15 7 The large aggregate sums that FECA allows PACs to spend, however, increases the possibility that PACs will exert a corrupting influence on political candidates. 15 8
In addition, the limits on party financing and the power PACs have gained
as a result conspire to encourage incumbency.1 59 While FECA does not allow
parties to favor incumbent candidates in their financing, PACs prefer incumbents because they view incumbency as an advantage and do not want to risk
backing a losing candidate. 160 Approximately three-fourths of the PAC money
contributed to Congressional races goes to incumbents, 161 and this fraction is

154. Jonathan S. Cohn, Money Talks, Reform Walks: Why FundraisersAren't Too Worried About
New Campaign Finance Laws, AM. PROSPECT, Fall 1993, at 66, 68.
155. MAGLEBY & NELSON, supra note 139, at 82. In contrast, party organizations have provided
only approximately 2.5% to 10.6% of the total money contributed to campaigns. Id. at 102-03.
156. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(2) (1988).
157. PACs can spend only $5000 per candidate in the general election. Id. The NCPAC decision
initially caused so much confusion that the FEC and Common Cause rushed reports to journalists to
dispel the notion that PACs had been given free rein to contribute money to candidates. Frank J. Sorauf,
Caught in a PoliticalThicket: The Supreme Court and Campaign Finance,3 CONST. COMMENTARY 97,
97 n.2 (1986).
158. Candidates find consolidated sources of contributions tempting because they do not particularly enjoy fundraising. "[T]he most demanding, disgusting, depressing and disenchanting part of politics is related to campaign financing." 120 CoNG. Rac. 8453 (1974) (statement of Sen. Humphrey). In
1988, the cost of a 30-second television advertisement in Tampa was approximately $6000. BAKER,
supra note 51, at 7.
159. See David K. Neidert, Campaign Reform: Fifteen Years After Buckley v. Valeo, 17 J. CoNTEMP. L. 289, 296-97 (1991) (indicating that in 1988 the average Senate incumbent received more than
eight times the amount of PAC contributions than the average Senate challenger and that for House
incumbents the ratio was more than 9.3 to one). Democratic incumbents in the House "received almost
twenty-five times more money [from PACs] than did Republican challengers." MAGLEBY & NELSON,
supra note 139, at 81-84.
160. See Richard B. Cheney, The Law's Impact on Presidentialand CongressionalElection Campaigns, in PARTIES, INTEREST GROUPS AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAWS 238, 246 (Michael J. Malbin ed.,
1980) (noting that PACs "like to have some degree of confidence that a candidate can win before they

commit their resources"); see also AL.EXANDER, supra note 13, at 3-4; MAGLEBY & NELSON, supra note
139, at 55 ("PACs often switch sides and contribute to the winning candidate after an election even
though they may have contributed to the opponent during it").
161. ALEXANDER, supra note 13, at 4. Compare JACOBSON, supra note 151, at 194 (arguing that
FECA protects incumbents) with Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 32, 33 n.38 (1976) (rejecting argument
that campaign finance restrictions protect incumbents).
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rising.' 62 Since most incumbents eventually win, it is not 63surprising that these
candidates may feel beholden to their PAC contributors.
Many federal incumbents now finance their campaigns primarily through4
PAC donations rather than through money raised from local constituents.1'6
This is most troublesome for candidates when PAC interests conflict with the
interests of the district or state they represent. Voters have become increasingly disenchanted with this situation, resorting in one case to suing politicians
165
in federal court for failure to represent their districts.
Although many people have denounced PACs, their influence can be beneficial to a democratic society, however. By providing a consolidated source of
nonparty funding, PACs supply provide an offsetting influence for those candidates who choose not to follow the party line. PACs also serve important functions that parties cannot, such as giving minority interests a distinct voice and
allowing people to rally around a single burning cause. 166 The PACs, for their
part, insist that their influence is exaggerated; not only have their numbers
dropped since 1987, but there are still so many PACs that competition among
them diminishes their influence. 167 But PACs have an incentive to cooperate
as well as to compete with each other.' 68 Not only are they unable to bring
competition to the electoral process in the way that parties do, but no single
PAC represents the breadth of interests found in the platforms of political parties. If parties were allowed higher contribution limits, they might be able to
wean candidates away from PAC money.
C. FECA's Contribution Limits on Political PartiesEliminate Unique
Opportunitiesfor Speech and Association
The Court has never directly addressed the constitutionality of the restrictions on party contributions to candidates. 169 Despite the interpretation of
some lower courts,' 70 the Supreme Court's silence is not necessarily an affir162. It's Time for the Senate to Act on Campaign FinanceReform, COMMON CAUSE MAG., Mar
Apr. 1989, at 46.
163. But see ALEXANDER, supra note 13, at 27 (arguing that lobbyists and PACs are "being
threatened with adverse legislative action for failure to make sizable campaign contributions").
164. See note 84 supra. In the wake of the FECA reforms, candidates have come to rely more on
their own personal campaign organizations than on their party. ANTHONY GiERZYNSKY, LEGISLATIVE
PARTY CAMPAIGN CoMIIrEES INTHE AMERICAN STATES 3 (1992); Ladd, supranote 14, at 86; see also

Richard E. Cohen, Party Help, 18 NAT'L J. 1998 (Aug. 16, 1986) (arguing that party congressional
campaign committees play a powerful role in the political process by directing campaigns and raising
money, and that candidates cooperate closely with the party committees).
165. Woo, supra note 8, at 11.
166. For a list of positive aspects of PACs, see ALEXANDER, supra note 13, at 171.
167. Id. at 20.
168. See JEFFREY M. BERRY, LOBBYING FOR THE PEOPLE: THE POLITICAL BEHAVIOR OF PUBLIC
INTERES'r GROUPS 254-55 (1977) (observing that 76% of the 83 interest groups polled indicated that
coalition activity with other groups was "very important" or "important" and that this figure reaches
83% when including groups that consider coalition activity "important but with qualifications").
169. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 23 (1976) (per curiam) (deferring to FECA's conflation of political parties and persons).
170. See Federal Election Comm'n v. National Republican Senatorial Comm., 761 F. Supp. 813,
822 (D.D.C. 1991) (holding that corruption concerns and contribution limits apply to political party
committees, because neither the Supreme Court nor Congress has ever indicated that corruption was not
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mation of constitutionality. When the constitutionality of a statute is in doubt,
courts are to assume Congress did not intend to pass an unconstitutional law. 17 1
The Supreme Court will not defer, however, when Congress overreaches and
enacts laws that raise "grave and doubtful constitutional questions."' 7 2 When
the quality of political speech is at stake, "new patterns of conduct and new
evidence of threats to the electoral process . . . might well cause the First

173
Amendment balance to be struck differently."'
Restrictions on party funding of candidates call for the existing constitutional balance to be readjusted. Party contributions differ substantially from the
kind of improper contributions Congress intended to restrict under FECA. The
Court has generally overlooked this distinction in its rulings on campaign finance law. Concentrating instead on the nature and effect of speech by individual contributors, it has remained silent about party speech.' 74 Yet party speech
made through contributions to candidates is qualitatively different from the
speech of other entities within the political process.
One of the differences lies in the distinction between "speech by proxy" and
direct political speech.' 75 Speech by proxy-that speech not made personally
by a group or candidate-merits less protection than direct speech. Contributions from individual voters are therefore "proxy speech" because someone
other than the contributor translates the money into speech. Direct speech by
individuals and PACs is still protected, however, because they may speak
through unlimited independent expenditures. In order to assure that political
actors retain an open avenue of communication, proxy speech can be legitimately restricted only when the contributor may also resort to protected direct
speech.
When applied to parties, the "speech by proxy" rationale fails precisely
76
because FECA does not allow parties to make independent expenditures.'
They cannot advertise on a candidate's behalf, distribute information about a
candidate, or otherwise conduct any kind of political speech about a candidate
outside FECA's limits. 177 Any message the party wishes to communicate regarding a specific candidate must take the form of a contribution to that candia concern when applied to political party committees). Such an interpretation is dangerous, because, if
carried to its logical conclusion, it would presume the constitutionality of every issue not yet ruled on by
the Supreme Court.
171. See Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 319 (1957) (indicating that courts should assume
that Congress avoids enacting potentially unconstitutional legislation).
172. Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1771 (1991).
173. Brief of Common Cause as Amicus Curiae at 41, Federal Election Comm'n v. National
Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480 (1985) (No. 83-1032).
174. See, e.g., Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21:
A limitation on the amount of money a person may give to a candidate.., involves little direct
restraint on his political communication, for it permits the symbolic expression of support
evidenced by a contribution but does not in any way infringe on the contributor's freedom to
discuss candidates and issues.
See also Gottlieb, supra note 6, at 203-08 (maintaining that Supreme Court has an "individualist philosophy of politices").
175. California Medical Ass'n v. Federal Election Comm'n, 453 U.S. 182, 196 (1981).
176. 2 U.S.C. § 441a (1988).
177. Id. § 441.
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date or an expenditure on her behalf. 178 If limiting the amount of money that a
candidate herself can spend in an election unconstitutionally blocks her only
avenue of direct communication, then limiting the amount of money that parties
can spend on candidates is unconstitutional for the same reason.
Parties offer unique opportunities for group political speech. Just as PACs
bring individuals together to promote a specific issue, 179 parties gather people
together in political association in a way which would be impossible for individuals or smaller groups. As the Supreme Court has noted, "[e]ffective advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly controversial ones,
is undeniably enhanced by group association, as this Court has more than once
recognized by remarking on the close nexus between the freedoms of speech
and assembly."' 180 The Supreme Court has even admitted that restricting contributions affects political speech "if the limitations prevent[ ] candidates and
political committees from amassing the resources need[ed] for effective advocacy."'181 In contrast to interest groups, parties provide a forum for speech
about disparate issues. FECA's restrictions on party speech about a candidate
discriminate against parties and inhibit their speech.
It is ironic that in contexts unrelated to campaign financing, individual justices have found that political parties serve a "variety of substantial governmental interests" which do not "justify tangential burdening of first amendment
rights."' 82 Yet Buckley and its progeny have not addressed the effect of FECA
regulations on party speech. 183 As a result, campaign reforms have had dubious,' 8 4 and in some cases harmful, effects.' 85 Despite the reformers' good intentions, FECA has not succeeded in returning power to the people. Moreover,
it is clear that the current state of campaign finance is "a symptom of the
broader failure of American political institutions to represent the electorate-a
86
symptom, unfortunately, that contributes to the disease."'
178. Id. In contrast, the Court in California Medical Association held that multicandidate PACs
are not "mouthpieces" of their contributors. 453 U.S. at 182.
179. See Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S.
480, 494 (1985) (maintaining that first amendment concerns are "squarely implicated" because PACs
serve as amplifiers for political expression). The Court reasoned that financial restrictions on independent expenditures by PACs would reduce the quality of expression and would be "like allowing a speaker
in a public hall to express his views while denying him the use of an amplifying system." Id at 493.
180. NAACP v. Alabama ex. rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
181. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 21 (1976) (per curiam).
182. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 527-28 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting).
183. See Jo Freeman, PoliticalParty Contributionsand Expenditures Under the FederalElection
CampaignAct: Anomalies and Unfinished Business, 4 PAcE L. REv. 267, 274-75 (1984).
184. See Gottlieb, supra note 6, at 216; Ladd, supra note 14, at 83, 93. For the argument that
FECA's regulation of campaign expenditures and contributions unjustifiably endangers the political system, see Gottlieb, supra note 6, at 191.
185. "The probity of the political system appears to have improved substantially before the most
recent great wave of primary reform and little, if at all, after.... [T]he effect of campaign disclosure
rules has been to increase the perception that politics is crooked." Sorauf, supra note 157, at 112-15,
118. Commentators disagree as to the precise effect of FECA. CompareM. Winograd, Commentary, in
PARTIES, INTREESr GROUPS AND CAMPAIGN FINANcE LAWS 305-07 (Michael J. Malbin ed., 1984) (finding that FECA has had a predominantly negative effect on the political parties) with SABATo, supranote
130, at 71 (observing that "parties have overcome many obstacles in the campaign finance statutes").
186. Cohn, supra note 154, at 72.

III.
A.
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KNOCKING DOWN THE BARRIERS TO POLITICAL SPEECH

Restrictions on PoliticalSpeech Deserve Strict Scrutiny

The freedoms of speech and association, though treasured features of any
democratic political process, do not receive absolute protection; under certain
conditions, the government may infringe them. 187

Furthermore, the First

Amendment does not protect all forms of speech equally.18 8 For example, the
Supreme Court accords far greater First Amendment protection to political
speech than to commercial speech. 189 When the government regulates public
speech not for its content, but in an attempt to preempt a resulting social ill,190
the regulation must meet three conditions: First, it must be content-neutral;
second, it must not foreclose alternative channels of communication; and third,
it must serve a compelling government interest. 191 Similarly, when the government restricts speech based on its content, and aims the restriction precisely at
the communicative impact of the speech, the Court will review the regulation
192
with the highest scrutiny.
Whenever the government intrudes on an individual's right to act under the
auspices of her chosen party or political organization, it interferes with her
freedom of association and must justify the restraint under strict review.19 3 As
such, when legislation abridges freedom of political association, the government must prove that the regulation employs "means closely drawn to avoid
unnecessary abridgment" of constitutional rights.1 94 Thus, when legislation involves the First Amendment freedoms of political speech and association, the
Court must review the challenged acts under strict scrutiny and uphold only
those restrictions that are "narrowly drawn" and absolutely necessary to serve a
195
compelling government interest.
187. Levine v. Supreme Court of Wisconsin, 679 F. Supp. 1478, 1490 (W.D. Wis. 1988) (discussing the right to associate).
188. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (posing the famous hypothetical of
falsely crying "fire" in a crowded theater).
189. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980);
Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971) (First Amendment freedoms have their "fullest
and most urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office."). See generally
Lillian R. BeVier, The FirstAmendment and PoliticalSpeech: An Inquiry into the Substance and Limits
of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REv. 299 (1978).
190. See TRIBE, supra note 80, at 791-92. Tribe describes such regulations as "aimed at noncommunicative impact but nonetheless having adverse effects on communicative opportunity." Id. at 790
(emphasis omitted).
191. See id. at 792.
192. See id. at 791-92.
193. "[Any interference with the freedom of a party is simultaneously an interference with the
freedom of its adherents." Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 487-88 (1975) (quoting Sweezy v. New
Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957)).
194. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978); see JoHN HART ELY, DEMoCRACY
AND DIsl UsT 105-06 (1980) ("Judicial review in this area must involve, at a minimum, the elimination
of any inhibition of expression that is unnecessary to the promotion of a government interest.").
195. See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958) ("[S]tate action
which may have the effect of curtailing the freedom to associate is subject to the closest scrutiny").
Note the difference between government interference with the right to form political associations and
interference with those institutions once they are formed. Buckley concerns the latter.
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Expenditure limitations, the Court has resolutely declared, demand strict
scrutiny.1 96 But contribution limitations do not receive this high standard of
review. Attempting to explain the tenuous distinction between such similar
forms of speech, the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that contribution limits only marginally impinge on the First Amendment. According to this logic,
the communicative importance of a contribution would be limited to the word
"yes," a mere nod of support by the contributor, conveyed with equal force
whether the speaker contributes one dollar or one thousand.
But concluding that different levels of contributions communicate the same
message does not make it so. The Court's logic forces the conclusion that a
political party communicates the same approval of a senatorial candidate
whether it contributes the statutory limit of $17,500 or only $1 to her campaign.
197
In fact, all else equal, the amount of a contribution carries its own message.
If $1 of party money says, "I like Ike," then $17,500 says, "I like Ike a lot." In
this light, the amount a party gives a candidate itself represents content worthy
of protection, and capping that amount regulates the content of the speech.
Any Congressional regulation of campaign finance amounts potentially endangers political speech and association and should receive the strictest judicial
review.198
B.

Concerns About Apparent and Actual Corruption in the Party-Candidate
Context Are Not Sufficiently Compelling

Corrupt: In politics, holding an office of trust for profit. 19 9
Influence:
In politics, a visionary quo given in exchange for a substantial
2oo
quid.
20 1
Politics: The conduct of private affairs for public advantage.
-Ambrose Bierce
The Supreme Court has upheld campaign financing restrictions on the
grounds that they promote a compelling state interest in preventing actual and
apparent corruption. 20 2 Any challenge to contribution or expenditure limits,
then, must address this accepted justification. This concern about corruption,
196. See, e.g., Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470
U.S. 480, 501 (1985); Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 299 (1981); First Nat'l
Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 795 (1978); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44 (1976) (per curiam).
197. The contribution of $1000 by an individual of modest means may represent an enormous
sacrifice whereas the same amount may be negligible to a wealthy individual. For purposes of this note,
I assume a $17,500 contribution by a political party does not represent a sacrifice.
198. See Nichol, supra note 22, at 323 ("[F]inancial regulations are also not simply limitations on
spending money. They limit the spending of money to engage in a particular activity, and that activity is
constitutionally protected. The impact on political expression is intentional, significant, and direct.");
Martin H. Redish, Campaign Spending Laws and the FirstAmendment, 46 N.Y.U. L. Rv.900, 907-08

(1971).
199. AMBROSE BIERcE, THm ENLARGED DEvm's DICTIONARY 48 (Ernest Jerome Hopkins ed.,

1967).
200. Id. at 156.
201. Id. at 222.
202. Leventhal, supranote 110, at 356-67, 379-80 (questioning the wisdom of the Buckley Court's
decision to restrict untested campaign finance laws).
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however, is misapplied in the case of a political party's support for its
candidates.
The Supreme Court defines corruption in the electoral process as the improper exchange of money for action by an officeholder, 20 3 or "dollars for
political favors." 2 4 Often the Court phrases corruption as a quid pro quo.20 5
Moreover, it has found that concerns about corruption are the "single narrow
exception to the rule that limits on political activity are contrary to the first
amendment."20 6 Some commentators argue that courts should use an "undue
influence" standard to define corruption, but the Court has rejected this definition as impermissibly vague. 20 7 Of the undue influence standard, Chief Justice
Burger said, "[t]here are many prices we pay for the freedoms secured by the
First Amendment; the risk of undue influence is one of them, confirming what
20 8
we long have known: Freedom is hazardous, but some restraints are worse."
The actual occurrence of corruption hinges on the intent and expectations of
the contributor. A contributor engages in corruption when she anticipates that
the candidate will change her position on an issue in exchange for the contribution. This creates two conceptual problems, flip sides of the same coin: Is it
still corruption if the contribution does not influence the candidate? Or what if
the contributor gives innocently but the contribution directly influences the candidate nonetheless? In either case the candidate's actual behavior in response
to the contribution is immaterial; only the contributor's subjective intent matters. As one commentator notes:
A "bribe" may take the form of a sum of money exchanged in return for the
promise of favorable treatment or to avoid the prospect of unfavorable treatment. Such promises can be implied as well as expressed; such prospects can
be imagined as well as real. As a result much money will change hands for
reasons that border on, or appear to be,20bribery,
but are not; much real bribery
9
will not be provable in a court of law.
203. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25-27 (1976) (per curiam); Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 497 (1985) ("Elected officials are influenced
to act contrary to their obligations of office by the prospect of financial gain to themselves or infusions
of money into their campaigns; Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290,296-97 (1981).
The hallmark of corruption is the financial quid pro quo: dollars for political favors."). The district
court in Buckley noted that 1% of the electorate accounts for 90% of the money contributed to candidates, parties, and political committees. Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 837 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (per
curiam), aff'd in partand rev'd in part,424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). The Supreme Court feared "the
impact of the appearance of corruption stemming from public awareness of the opportunities for abuse
inherent in a regime of large individual financial contributions." Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27.
204. National Conservative PoliticalAction Comm., 470 U.S. at 497. For a discussion of contrasting interpretations of "corruption," see LARRY BERG, HARLAN HAHN & JOHN R. SCHMIDHAUSER,
CORRUPrION IN THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM 3, 7 (1976).
205. See, e.g., National Conservative PoliticalAction Comm., 470 U.S. at 497; Buckley, 424 U.S.
at 26-27.
206. Citizens Against Rent Control,454 U.S. at 296-97; see also National Conservative Political
Action Comm., 470 U.S. at 496-97 (noting that "preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption
are [sic] the only legitimate and compelling government interests" in regulating campaign finance).
207. See, e.g, Buckley, 424 U.S. at 239 (Burger, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
("Congress has used a shotgun to kill wrens as well as hawks.").
208. Id. at 256-57 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
209. MUTCH, supra note 20, at 65; see also Dawn Tae Thorsness, Independent Expenditures: Can
Survey Research Establish a Link to Declining Citizen Confidence in Government?, 10 HAsrINos
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What then of a situation where nothing unlawful occurs, but the public
finds something malodorous about the transaction? The Court has always
equated the appearance of corruption with actual corruption. At first glance
this treatment appears counterintuitive. Society justifiably attempts to prevent
actual corruption because it threatens the democratic process by distorting the
mechanisms of representative democracy and allowing the wealthy to influence
candidates out of proportion to the power they would wield in a "one person,
one vote" system. 2 10 But what damage results from the appearanceof corruption? In a representative democracy, where the people trust elected officials to
assume power fairly, the appearance of corruption can be devastating. Thus,
the Supreme Court has always found the interest in preventing both the appearance of corruption and actual corruption sufficiently compelling to justify First
Amendment restrictions.
I do not dispute the importance of limiting the appearance of corruption.
But I do insist that before we restrict First Amendment freedoms, we be quite
certain that there is at least such an appearance. If a reasonable person would
not consider a particular transaction corrupt, limiting that transaction to prevent
an appearance of corruption is a logical fallacy. Because the Supreme Court
has recognized that party support of candidates may actually reduce outside
corruptive influences, the contribution limits FECA places on political parties
perpetuate precisely this logical error.21 ' Nonetheless, FECA tightly caps party
funding of candidates on the ground that such an exchange might appear
212

corrupt.
Under the Court's narrow "quid pro quo" definition of corruption, partycandidate relationships present little danger. 21 3 An improper quid pro quo is
Corsr. L.Q. 763 (1983) (discussing the kinds of evidence and proof required to convince the Court that
corruption exists).
210. See, e.g., Daniel Hays Lowenstein, On Campaign Finance Reform: The Root of All Evil is
Deeply Rooted, 18 HoFsTRA L. REv. 301, 302 (1989) ("The payment of money to bias the judgment or
sway the loyalty of persons holding positions of public trust is a practice whose condemnation is deeply
rooted in our most ancient heritage.").
211. The Court has stated that the use of party funds "reduces the candidate's dependence on
outside contributions and thereby counteracts the coercive pressures and attendant risks of abuse to
which the Act's contribution limits are directed." Buckley, 424 U.S. at 53.
212. See Federal Election Comm'n v. National Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 210 (1982)
(noting the potential for corruption justifies "prophylactic measures"). While there is no proof of outright corruption through campaign financing, the lack of evidence does not resolve the issue. Empirically, it is much harder to prove corruption's absence than its presence. Nevertheless, the fact that the
Court is unlikely to look at empirical evidence to determine the potential for corruption actually supports
the argument that corruption in the party context is not a danger.
213. For the view that quid pro quo corruption does not exist, see Paul S. Edwards & Nelson W.
Polsby, Introduction: The JudicialRegulation of PoliticalProcesses-In Praiseof Multiple Criteria,9
YAuS L. & POL'Y REv. 190, 196-97 (1991). For an opposing view, see Gerald G. Ashdown, Controlling
Campaign Spending and the "New Corruption": Waitingfor the Court,44 VAND. L. Rv. 767, 767-70
(1991) (asserting that Buckley and related cases have gutted legislative attempts at campaign reform).
Some commentators suggest that one of the benefits of lifting limits on party committee contributions to
candidates would be an increase in the electorate's faith in the political process. Evan A. Davis, Election Law Reform in the State of New York 51 ALa. L. RE. 1 (1986) (stating that in the wake of political
scandal in New York City, the public viewed campaign finance reform as the most effective way to
improve public perception of government). In the context of corporate contributions, where the contributing organization is a profit-making enterprise, as opposed to a political association, the Court applies a
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most feasible when an individual or clique in control of party contributions to
candidates attempts to use that power to leverage favors from a candidate.
Some commentators have argued that using "large contributions to induce candidates to adhere to the party's platform is just the sort of quidpro quo bearing
'on candidates' positions and on their actions if elected' that the Court has
found to have the potential to undermine 'the integrity of our system of representational democracy.' ",214 This argument is flawed for three reasons. First,
the party remains accountable to the electorate and has group interests that its
members do not have individually.2 15 If a party remained so isolated from the
electorate that its platform did not reflect the beliefs of its members, it would
quickly lose adherents. Because a party needs long term credibility with the
electorate, it has a powerful incentive to prevent the appearance of corruption.
Second, the danger that a single individual within the party will unduly influence a candidate is ameliorated by the candidate's ability to receive funds from
sources outside the party's control. In this way, PACs may even serve a democratizing function. Finally and most importantly, FECA's current disclosure
provisions require that an individual who has any "direction or control" over
the party's contributions must report the money under her control.2 1 6 Maintaining such strict disclosure requirements will help avoid the problem of individuals within a party using campaign funding to buy political favors.
Any large contribution from a discrete source could give rise to the appearance of quid pro quo corruption. This is precisely why FECA prevents wealthy
individuals from bankrolling candidates. In the context of candidates financing
themselves with personal funds, however, the Supreme Court has found the
opportunity for a quid pro quo lacking. 2 17 Corruption cannot occur where the
receiver already advocates the same views as the giver. For the same reason,
concerns about party-candidate corruption do not justify restricting party
speech.
Even when the candidate and the party have different views on an issue, it
is not a foregone conclusion that the party would use money to influence a
candidate's speech. 2 18 Cause and effect may be reversed; the party may choose
to increase a candidate's funding precisely because of her stand on an issue, not
to change her stand.2 1 9 If this is the case, then the corruption rationale behind
FECA misses the mark. Use of financial support to encourage adherence to the
party platform is not the kind of corruption that concerns the Court. At most,
this represents an example of party qua party influence, and "[s]trong ties bebroader definition of corruption. See, e.g., Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 110 S. Ct. 1391,
1397 (1991).
214. Brief for the Federal Election Commission at 34, Federal Election Comm'n v. National Republican Senatorial Comm., 966 F.2d 1471 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (No. 91-5176) (citations omitted).
215. See notes 115-135 supra and accompanying text.
216. 2 U.S.C. § 434 (1988).
217. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 51-60. The Court stated that use of personal funds diminished a candidate's reliance on potentially corrupting outside influences. Id. at 53.
218. See, e.g., SoRAuF, supranote 145, at 312 & n.26 (stating that there is no evidence supporting
"the popular assertions about the 'buying' of candidates").
219. Id.; cf. JACOBSON, supra note 151, at 51-104 (exploring theories of who contributes to political campaigns and why).
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tween parties and their candidates never have been viewed as corrupt in themselves." 220 Party qua party influence over a candidate also performs the
positive social function of labeling a candidate for voters. Since the candidate
is allied with the party's established reputation, voters have clearer expectations
of what the candidate stands for.
The appearance of corruption hinges on whether the contributor expects the
candidate to feel beholden for her largesse. Because a candidate reasonably
expects support from her party, the public probably would not conclude that the
party gives its support in exchange for the candidate altering her position on an
issue. The electorate more likely views party support as normal and anything
but corrupt. In the final analysis, concerns about apparent and actual corruption
are not sufficiently compelling in the context of party funding of candidates to
justify the First Amendment infringements that result from FECA's limitations
on party contributions.
IV.

A.

SILENCE

Is

NOT THE ANSWER: PUTTING FREEDOM BACK
IN POLITICAL SPEECH

The Soft Money Problem

The Court's prediction in Buckley that "[i]t would naively underestimate
the ingenuity and resourcefulness of persons and groups desiring to buy influence to believe that they would have much difficulty devising expenditures that
skirted the restriction on express advocacy of election or defeat but nevertheless benefited the candidate's campaign" 22 ' was remarkably prescient. As a
result of the soft money loophole, parties have been able to skirt FECA's limits
by counting money spent for the benefit of federal candidates as a state party
expense.

222

Although a comprehensive discussion of soft money is beyond the scope of
this note, soft money can contribute significantly to the appearance of corruption. 223 Any attempt to reduce this occurrence, therefore, must address the soft
money problem. Soft money was sanctioned by the 1979 amendments to
FECA,2 24 which have been called "a conscious effort by Congress to empower
220. Brief for the Federal Election Commission at 22, Federal Election Comm'n v. National Republican Senatorial Comm., 966 F.2d 1471 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (No. 91-5176).
221. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 45 (1976) (per curiam).
222. See JACKSON, supranote 25, at 39-42 (crediting soft money with increasing voter cynicism).
223. As a recent editorial bluntly stated: "Not all issues in the world fit in either/or categories, but
this one does. Either you are for campaign reform or you are for the soft-money loophole." Please
Holdfor the President,N.Y. TimEs, Mar. 14, 1993, at 16; see also Charles R. Babcock, Weighing 'Soft
Money' Donations; CandidateClinton Pledgedto Cut the Flow to Party Committees, WASH. POST, Mar.
8, 1993, at A13 (quoting Fred Wertheimer, Common Cause president: "Ending this system is the
threshold test for the president in carrying out his public commitment to real reform of the current,
totally discredited campaign finance system.").
224. See 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(B) (1988) ('The term 'expenditure' does not include ... (ii) nonpartisan activity designed to encourage individuals to vote or to register to vote...; (iv) the payment by a
State or local [party] of... the costs of... a printed slate card or sample ballot...; (viii) the payment
by a State or local [party] of the costs of campaign materials.., used by such committee in connection
with volunteer activities on behalf of nominees of such party...; (ix) the payment by a State or local
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state and local party committees in federal campaigns. ' '2 5 FECA exempts
from federal contribution and expenditure limits money raised for certain state
and local party activities, although such money must come "from contributions
subject to the limitations and prohibitions of [FECA]. '226 Money spent on the
general activities outlined by the 1979 amendments must be "hard," and therefore subject to federal limitations on contributions, if it is spent on behalf of
federal candidates. And there's the rub. State committees also conduct these
activities on behalf of state and local candidates, often in the form of "mixed"
federal-state activities for the party's candidates. Neither the FEC nor Congress has ever come to grips with the problem of determining which moneys
are spent for federal campaigns-and thus counted as "hard"-and which moneys are spent for nonfederal candidates-and thus legitimately considered
"soft' money not subject to federal limits.
FEC regulations require that a portion of the soft money which redounds to
the benefit of a federal candidate must be counted toward that candidate's federal limits on a "reasonable basis. 22 7 The FEC has never elaborated upon
these guidelines. In the ensuing vacuum, individuals have been able to use the
party as a conduit for large contributions of soft money to help particular candidates.22 8 Both parties' presidential campaigns in 1984, 1988, and 1992 raised
tens of millions of dollars of soft money to improve their election chances. 229
The soft money problem is not one that will be easily solved. Because states'
rights issues are involved, virtually any allocation method devised may cut
back on soft money, but will not eliminate the opportunity for millions of dollars to be raised and spent on mixed federal-state activities.
Eliminating or raising the limits on party funding of federal candidates
would not exacerbate the soft money problem because the additional money
flowing to candidates would be "hard." Rather than attempt to prevent the
appearance of corruption by capping party funding of candidates, the soft
money problem can be attacked by banning contributions from individuals to
parties intended to benefit a particularfederal candidate. This does not run
afoul of First Amendment guarantees because an individual's speech is not silenced: She can express her views about a particular federal candidate by contributing directly to that candidate under FECA's limits or by buying her own
ads. Narrowly tailoring the means of reform to the ends of reducing the appearance of corruption requires striking at the source of the soft money problem
rather than placing a ceiling on party funding of candidates.

party ... of the costs of voter registration and get-out-the-vote activities conducted by such committee
on behalf of nominees of such party for President and Vice President.").
225. ALEXANDER, supra note 13, at 67.
226. 2 U.S.C. §§ 431(9)(B)(viii), (ix) (1988).
227. 11 C.F.R. § 106.1 (1994).
228. JACKSON, supra note 25, at 40.
229. See generally ELIZABETH HEDLAND, CErER FOR RESPONSIVE PoLMcs, Jus-icE DE.AYED,
JUsTIcE DENIED: THE FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION's ENFORCEMENT RECORD (1992); JACKSON,

supra note 25, at 39-42.
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Congress Should Tighten the Means-Ends Fit

Regardless of whether the Supreme Court soon confronts the constitutionality of FECA's restrictions on party contributors, Congress will have to face the
issue as it tackles legislation this term that attempts to amend FECA.230 Above
all, Congress should ensure a tight means-end fit for reform legislation: Safeguards against corruption must not sweep so broadly that they infringe core
231
constitutional rights.
Congress badly needs to tighten FECA's current means-ends fit. FECA
already contains various narrowly tailored protections against corruption. For
example, in an effort to limit undue influence by the wealthy, Congress restricted the amount that individuals can directly contribute to their favorite candidates and political parties. In addition, FECA mandates that party officials
who are in a position to direct money to candidates disclose their interests and
the money they distribute. 232 These provisions eliminate-or at least severely
reduce-the ability of party chieftains to control candidates financially.
With these safeguards in place, the ceiling on candidate support by parties
is redundant and overbroad; it provides little additional protection against corruption. Furthermore, even if the asserted state interests were sufficiently compelling to justify additional protections against corruption, FECA's contribution
233
limits on parties would still be too restrictive of First Amendment rights.
Below I propose some alternatives that restrict party speech and association
less than FECA's current limitations. These proposals are not all-encompassing measures; rather, they represent general guidelines for Congress.
1.

Vouchers.

In order to avoid the appearance of corruption that often accompanies the
exchange of money while simultaneously protecting party speech, Congress
could allow political parties to issue an unlimited number of advertising vouchers to their candidates. For example, parties could contract with TV or radio
stations to allow candidates to redeem the vouchers in exchange for advertising
time. By limiting the vouchers to the production of political speech, the party
reduces the chance that they will be transformed into activities outside the
scope of the First Amendment. Moreover, vouchers lessen the problem contributors present of appearing to buy a candidate's loyalty. Vouchers protect
opportunities for party speech, while limiting the appearance of corruption.
230. See Kenneth J. Levit, Note, Campaign FinanceReform and the Return ofBuckley v. Valeo,
103 YALE LJ.460, 470 (1993) (discussing Congress' grappling with campaign finance reform).
231. One must question whether the legislature's ability to amend any statute promotes its members' interests. Surveyed candidates reported that FECA's contribution restrictions favor incumbents by
imposing "far more serious strictures on challengers than on incumbents. The challengers in particular
find fund raising under the current law very difficult and time-consuming." INsrrrum OF PoLrrcs,
supra note 12, at 7.
232. 11 C.F.R. § 110.6(d)(2) (1994).
233. See Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 508-11 (1964) (holding that where a compelling state interest exists to restrain constitutional freedoms, the regulation must confine itself to the
minimum restriction necessary).
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A separatefund.

If Congress is concerned about "the opportunities for abuse inherent in a
regime of large individual contributions," 234 then it could allow parties to provide unlimited funding to candidates out of a fund composed of only small,
unearmarked, individual contributions. Currently, individuals may contribute
up to $5000 to political committees. 2 35 Were Congress to decide that this was
too large a sum to be indirectly passed on to a candidate from an individual, it
could cap contributions to this fund at $1000 or some amount small enough to
lay to rest concerns about corruption.
3.

Restricting nonspeech activities.

FECA limits the amount of money parties can contribute to candidates for
speech activities, such as advertising, and spend on nonspeech activities, such
as the candidate's lodging. 236 It is not necessary to restrict both. Unlike restrictions on contributions to support speech activities, limitations on party expenditures to finance nonspeech activities do not create First Amendment
conflicts. Congress should therefore consider amending FECA to eliminate the
restrictions on party speech, while maintaining the limits on party expenditures
for nonspeech activities. This would effectively guard against corruption without unnecessarily impinging on the First Amendment freedoms of political
parties.
4.

Higher limits.

Raising the limits on the amounts parties can contribute to their candidates
is another less restrictive alternative to the current funding levels. Although
any restraints arguably impinge on First Amendment rights, higher limits constitute a more narrowly tailored method of promoting the goal of reducing corruption. This approach is also the least likely to destroy the efficacious features
of FECA. Finally, because raising the limits presents the least invasive means
of amending FECA, Congress might consider this proposal easiest to pass.
The disadvantages of merely increasing the ceilings on party spending,
however, are legion. If funding limits are unconstitutional, simply raising them
does not address the fundamental constitutional issue. Another problem with
raising limits, as opposed to eliminating them outright, is the difficulty of finding a standard by which to set new limits. Congress might choose to fix contribution limits based on the population of the state or district, as it did with
expenditure limits.237 This solution offers an objective way to establish limits,
although it also raises several problems. First, the same amount of money may
have a different effect in different states. Second, parties would want to spend
more money in states with close elections, even though such states may have
234. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 27 (1976) (per curiam).
235. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(C) (1988).
236. Expenditures and contributions include any payments made "for the purpose of influencing
an election for federal office." Id. §§ 431(8)(A), (9)(A).
237. Id. § 441a(d).
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small populations not justifying large expenditures. Third, setting the acceptable ratio of expenditures per person for both House and Senate races would be a
hotly contested partisan matter.
Whether any limit on funding can avoid infringing party speech depends
upon whether the limitation is the least restrictive alternative. Levels of funding closely tailored to the cost of advertising might represent a permissible
level of restriction. Ideally, however, a newly amended FECA would end all
limits on party contributions to support candidate speech.
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court has never addressed the constitutionality of limits on
direct party funding of candidates, but courts will most likely face that issue
soon. When they do, they should apply strict scrutiny in analyzing the asserted
government interests, and strike down the restrictions as overbroad. The government's concern about corruption between candidates and parties is overblown. A party and its candidate have neither the opportunity nor the
motivation for a quid pro quo, making corruption very unlikely. While money
alone does not determine the outcome of an election, limits on party financing
drastically affect the political process. 238 These limitations curb party advocacy, potentially alter the content and diversity of candidate speech, and deprive political parties of their First Amendment rights.
Political parties are an integral part of the democratic process; they represent majority interests while protecting minorities and providing a unifying
force for interest groups. 2 39 When parties face limits on the amount they can
contribute to candidates, the political process loses the unique opportunities for
speech and association that parties provide. PAC speech, in contrast, does not
suffer because PACs possess alternative means of communication denied to
political parties, such as independent expenditures.
One of the main sources of the appearance of corruption is the prevalence
of soft money in the political system, a problem that restrictions on party funding of federal candidate speech fail to address. Congress should therefore consider campaign finance reforms that restrict party speech less than the current
limits. Vouchers that can only be converted into speech represent one such
option. Other options include funding candidates out of a collection of individual contributions, limiting only that funding which finances nonspeech activities, or raising the existing limits. Political parties provide an important voice
for people who lack the financial resources or organization to form PACs to
advocate on their behalf. Unless courts protect the First Amendment rights of
political parties, the forces of power and privilege will continue to shout down
the voice of the people.
238. Polsby, supra note 25, at 266-72 (suggesting that the advantages of money in elections may
reach a point of diminishing returns and factors other than money may be crucial to the outcome of
elections).
239. See KiRKPATmcK, supra note 118, at 5 (explaining the role of parties in creating political
leaders). See generally ScHAmrscmamwaR, supra note 116.

